【苏晓康按：仁，两人同怀
五四纪年已过一百零五年，中国还在专制制度中，这个现实，实乃五四之耻；
又因为五四是一个双源头：新文化运动和中国共产党，这两个源头塑造了今日中国，极度腐败和残暴的中共，也在北京隆重地庆祝五四。
竭力促使现代中国走向宪政的西方国家及其政府和学界，其实早已开始了一种新论述，即诠释人权、民主这些普世价值，原已植根于中国传统价值之中，无需从西方引进，这当然是政治和学理上的一个突破。因为源自哈佛费正清的「中国革命合理论」，诠释中国朝代循环非西方模式，须有革命破处之，中共太喜欢这个理论了。
现任美国国会及行政当局中国委员会 (CECC) 主任Piero A. Tozzi，最近撰文《中华人共和国建国七十五周年之反思：民主、人权、以及中国传统》，便是这一努力的最新体现。尤其他诠释李克强生前引用一句谚语「人在干，天在看」，在中国传统话语中，恰是「号召人民来推翻，甚至处死一位因压迫人民、而丧失统治权利的暴君，这也是所说的『天命』」，其深刻和现实的程度，大大超越当下的中文论述。
他也论述了儒家的普世性，并提到张彭春这个人。
在此之前，美国人博明以流利普通话讲中国的“五四”，也提到张彭春，我却很陌生，一查才知道是一个“五四”的大才子。
张彭春（1892年4月22日－1957年7月19日），字仲述，天津人，中国戏剧家、教育家、外交家、哲学家，南开校长张伯苓的胞弟，所谓“津门二杰”。他还是联合国人权委员会副主席暨《世界人权宣言》起草委员会副主席。
张彭春引进儒家思想，建议把“仁”——“两人同怀”或同情，放在宣言的结尾语中。 “应该强调人权方面，”张彭春说，“作为人类，他必须经常意识到他人，与自己生活同一社会中的其他人。”
多年前，我曾听余英时教授跟哥伦比亚大学的黎安友教授辩论，Prof.Nathan说，中国传统没有“人权”思想，余先生不同意，说儒家“仁”的思想，就是“人权”的因子，“仁”就是两人、他人。现在才知道，这可能就是从张彭春那里来的。
五四时期，张彭春还同胡适、徐志摩、梁实秋、陈源(西滢)等文友筹备组织文学社，社名尚未确定。张彭春便把“新月”二字推荐给朋友们，此即“新月社”的来历。
张彭春1957年7月19日因心脏病发作，逝世于美国新泽西州，终年65岁。】
未来中国论坛—-中华人民共和国建国七十五周年之反思：民主、人权、以及中国传统
By Piero A. Tozzi（注1）
在中华人民共和国（以下简称「中国」）建国七十五周年来临之际，让我们共同反思，在中国共产党（以下简称「中国」）的领导下，中国是如何偏离规范的。不仅是偏离国际规范，也是中国历史上已知的规范。
对中国共产党统治合法性的意识形态挑战？
2012 年，约莫是习近平从中国共产党总书记，晋升为最高领导人的同时，一份被称为 「中办发〔2013〕9号」的文件在中国共产党上层中传阅。对英语母语者较为熟悉的正式名称为 《关于当前意识形态领域情况的通报》（注2）。中办发〔2013〕9号声称受到许多来自西方的意识形态威胁，挑战中国共产党对中国的控制及其统治权的合法性。 文件中指出来自西方的威胁包括「宪政民主」、包括「三权分立」和「普选」的原则、以及「普世价值」的概念，也就是「超越时间和空间、超越国家和阶级、适用于全人类」的东西。
这当中隐含的假设是，民主、宪政体制、尊重人权等原则，与中国传统格格不入，因此必须予以摒弃。 然而，确实可以承认或是雀跃，这些思想确实对中国共产党的合法性和统治权构成了威胁，但是，这些思想和理想真的与中国传统格格不入吗？ 或者它们是否符合中国传统，将人民的福祉视为至高无上，并凌驾于那些声称拥有统治权的人之上？
李克强死亡的意义
去年十月，前总理李克强在游泳时因心脏病意外病世，享年 68 岁，以中国领导人的标准来说，是英年早逝。李前总理生前，特别是与习近平相比时，一直被视为改革家。 尽管他既非圣人，也非民主人士，而是共产党高层和政治局成员，但他主张的政策确实与习近平的政策形成了强烈的对比，并在他有生之年获得了一定程度的赞誉，这些在他逝世后，民众的悲痛中得以体现。
其中，最重要的，也是与我的演讲特别相关的，是他辞世之前的一次演说，他引用了一句意味深长的谚语「人在干，天在看」（注3）。
然而当西方媒体明知这句话是在暗自挑战习近平的同时，CNN 仅轻描淡写地把这段话形容为在「隐晦地提醒老百姓们，领导人的行为将会受到历史的审判」。但其更深层的意义并没有被 CNN 完全表达出来。 （注4）从更深的意义上来说，李克强这番话能解释为号召人民来推翻，甚至处死一位因压迫人民、而丧失统治权利的暴君，这也是所说的「天命」。
推翻暴君和民主的雏型概念
李克强所称之天命呼应了一句千古名言：「天视自我民视，天听自我民听」。
这句话记载在最初出现的书经中，最著名的引述是在战国时期（公元前三至四世纪），孔子最伟大的弟子孟子的一段话。
据孟子所言，人民的福祉至高无上，凌驾于君主，曰「民为贵，社稷次之，君为轻。」——《孟子·尽心下》章句十四。统治人民是有条件的权利，故曰「君有大过则谏，反覆之而不听，则易位矣……宣王变色。」——《孟子·梁惠王下》章
另言之，在中国传统中推翻政府和君主是有正当性的。然而，孟子亦阐明了采取此激进举动的时机，是在君主及其政府沦为暴政，道德被瓦解之时。孟子说：「贼仁者谓之贼，贼义者谓之残。残贼之人谓之一夫。闻诛一夫纣矣，未闻弑君也。」——《孟子·梁惠王下》章
在这种情况下，谋杀暴君是正当的，这不应与弑君混为一谈，因为暴君不再有统治的权力，他的（错误）统治只是基于原始权力的行使和任意适用实法，这与君主的合法统治不同。
那么暴君的特征是什么呢？罔顾法律之上的律法 「道」，而欺压人民。因为「天视自我民视，天听自我民听。」 这样的君主失去了天命，他的统治不再合法。 因此，他既可能被废黜，也可能被处死。有趣的是，公元13世纪的圣多马斯-阿奎那（St. Thomas Aquinas）也被问到相同的问题，并提出了以自然法为基础的平行答案。
在《孟子》中，能看到「民主原型」的思想：虽然君主统治为世袭，但是君主也有必须以人民福祉为优先的相对责任。确实，如上所述，孟子指出在适当的优先顺序下，人民须居首位。其次是国家负责的五股粮食和祭坛。最后，才为君主。
再者，现代语言中的「人权」也许对孟子来说很陌生，但是儒家思想中的「仁」，当中人性尊严的概念其实是十分明显的。与第九号文件相反，这些概念绝非西方所强加，而是在中国传统中根深蒂固。
当深受推崇的李克强提出了天命论后，习近平当然很有可能将这番言论跟这个人视为对他直接的挑战。尽管有些人猜测李克强之死并非自然死亡，但目前尚无公开证据表示，习近平在李克强之死中扮演了直接或间接的角色。（注5）
中国民主和宪政体制–中华民国在台湾的模型
不可否认的是，如果要驳斥中国共产党声称民主和宪政违反中国政治传统的论点，仅需看现今台湾的制度即可。这也是为何中国共产党意图欺压这个独立的民主国家，希望使其投降的原因。李登辉在 1996 年成为第一任直接民选总统，就直接否定了大选违反东亚文化圈的论述。（注6）
但是，宪政和权力分立是如何呢？中办发〔2013〕9号也抨击其违反中国传统。 有趣的是，孙中山在构思中华民国宪法时，摒弃了西方三权分立的概念，而采用五权分立的模式，他认为这种模式部分植根于中国历史的帝制观念。 这种五权分立的模式也反映在中华民国 1947 年的宪法中，也就是现今台湾的宪法。
除了西方的行政、立法、司法三权分立外，中华民国的宪法增加了两种权利，分别为考试院和监察院。原因为何？
孙中山博士的观点是，用人唯才和监督都深植于中国的历史。不同于帝王制度是纯粹专制的想法，研读儒家经典的士大夫阶级，经过民主考试制度选拔后，理论上不论其阶级背景，皆能制衡皇权，提供监督的功能。皇帝的权力不是绝对的。沦陷至暴政的绝对主义者会被推翻，前述的士大夫有道德责任对君主的不义行为提出谏言。在阻止皇权过度扩张的过程中，有时候，尽忠职守的士大夫是「冒死进谏」（谏死）。
这种谏言的责任是建立在儒家的孝道观念中：「资于事父以事君，而敬同也。孔子在《孝经》中说道「父有争子，则身不陷于不义。故当不义，则子不可以不争于父，臣不可以不争于君；故当不义，则争之」（注7）
因此，尽管帝制本身没有宪法，可制衡制度如果存在于在历史上，就可以被理解为与中国传统一致的有机宪法。直到今天，英国也没有一部成文的独立宪法，但这并不表示英国没有宪法。 故，尽管中国共产党拒绝这种形式的宪法，但其并非与违背中国传统。 事实上，它促成了《中华民国宪法》，一部现代颁布的宪政概念法令，一旦中国摆脱了共产党的独裁统治，这部宪法可以作为未来中国的典范。
全球人权
有人可能会争论儒家思想，是否类似于西方的自然法则理论，「超越时空，超越国家和阶级，适用于全人类」，我的答案是肯定的。 我认为儒家思想确实适用于全人类，并能钻研其中，且用于全人类的福祉上，但一个更现实的讨论：是关于1948年的《世界人权宣言》（UDHR）中所包含的原则是否如中办发〔2013〕9号中所述，与中国的传统相悖，而并非违背中国共产党的极权主义。
要回答这个问题前，我们必须回顾一下《世界人权宣言》的起草人是如何从中国，特别是儒家思想中取经，创造出一个真正具有普世性的宣言。
在起草《世界人权宣言》之前，联合国教育、科学及文化组织，或称联合国教科文组织(UNESCO)，在托马斯哲学家雅克·马里顿（ Jacques Maritain） 的领导下，调查了人权概念的哲学基本概念。 罗忠恕(Lo Chung-shu)撰写了一篇标题为「中国传统中的人权」(Human Rights in the Chinese Tradition)的文章，指出虽然传统中没有现代的「权利」(rights)词汇，但「权利」(rights)与邻里间的相互义务或责任(duties)对等的概念确实存在。（注8）
事实上，《世界人权宣言》起草委员会的八位成员中，包括了张彭春，他是中华民国的代表，也是召集联合国人权委员会的副主席。他的思想反映了儒家思想对权利和义务的概念，以及针对在较少个人主义、较多社会主义色彩的前提下，应当如何行使这些权利的做法。（注9）
儒家思想的影响明显可见，举例来说，在第29(1)条提及义务时提到：「人人对社会负有义务,因为只有在社会中他的个性才可能得到自由和充分的发展。」张彭春在《世界人权宣言》谈判时的候补人吴经熊，对自然法也有非常深入的了解。从他与查尔斯·马利克 (Charles Malik) 和雅克·马里顿 (Maritain) 等起草人的共同观点中，能理解到吴经熊具有天主教和儒家的双重互补情感。
所以，中办发〔2013〕9号文件刻意回避这份主要反映中国传统世界观、达成全球人权里程碑的宣言，是满讽刺的。也许中国共产党领导层害怕，若是根据《世界人权宣言》的标准来追究中国共产党违反人权的责任，会发现，其不仅违反了国际规范，也违反了中国历史上的规范。
谁能将尊重人权和民主带入中国？
最重要的原则是：中国的民主改革必须从你们开始。不是透过外在的力量，也不是从美国。中国的民主改革从中国人开始。
但对我们而言，我们美国必须停止把稳定放在首位，停止支持现有政权。我们不能跟中国共产党站在一起，然后对抗中国人民。
另外，美国国会与美国政府、美国企业以及西方企业必须停止对暴政的补助。
举例来说，去年美国国会的中国执行委员会举行了一场听证会，其名为「从诱饵到餐桌：中国的强迫劳动如何污染美国的海鲜供应链。」 美国政府的食品采购计画在五年内从不法的中国来源采购了价值约2 亿美元的海鲜，其中包括国防部国防后勤署为美国军事基地采购的鱼类，以及美国农业部为联邦补贴的全国学校午餐计划采购的鱼类。
在这当中，美国政府至少违反了三项美国法律：1930 年关税法第307 条（禁止所有使用强迫劳动生产的商品）、防止维吾尔人强迫劳动法（禁止使用维吾尔强迫劳动生产的商品）、和美国制裁敌对国家法案CAATSA（禁止使用北朝鲜强迫劳动生产的商品），因为中国在捕鱼业中，同时使用从维吾尔自治区转押的维吾尔人和北朝鲜工人来捕鱼或加工鱼类。
对美国企业而言，他们同样需要清除其供应链中使用强迫劳动制造的商品。 没错，他们必须这样做：因为这是法律规定的。
本质上来说，我们必须重新审视美国对于后毛泽东「改革时代」的中国政策的前提要件。引用詹姆士·曼（James Mann）的说法，中国参与受规范、自由贸易制度的国际体系，能促进中国的法治发展，并且最终实现政治自由化，这个想法已被证明是「天方夜谭」 。
没错。余茂春(Miles Yu) 强烈地指出，政府补贴受惠的出口产业、窃取智慧财产权、透过奴隶劳工来人为压低价格的中央集权命令式经济，可以融入全球自由贸易体系，这种本身就是个荒谬的想法。
然而，中国日益壮大的经济实力，使其得以对这种以受规范的秩序提出系统性的替代方案，这种方案让普世人权规范必须臣服于中国共产党的政治和意识形态指令。 我们必须抵制。
中国共产党在中办发〔2013〕9号和其他文件中声称，民主、宪政和尊重人权不是中国传统的一部分。 我们必须反抗这种说法。这种说法违背了许许多多中国人的心声，不仅是当代的声音，以及来自中国伟大传统和文化遗产的历史声音。
相反地，如果我们不理会来自中国共产党的杂音，仔细聆听，会听到中国人民真实的声音说：「民主必胜。」
谢谢。
2014年9月23日于华盛顿DC
注1：Piero A. Tozzi 现任美国国会及行政当局中国委员会 (CECC) 主任。本文是2024年9月23日在华盛顿特区国会游客中心举行的华人民主论坛上的讲话的延伸版本。本文所表达的观点仅为个人观点，不代表CECC的观点。 本文作者感谢黄小姐和AW 提供意见和审查，并感谢Anna Wang （王瑞琴）邀请，能让作者在论坛上发表意见。
注2：中办发〔2013〕9号分析与翻译可参照下列网址：https://ia801406.us.archive.org/2/items/document-no.-9/Document%20No.%209.pdf.
注3 ：对于华南地区的人来说，尤其是那些以福建/台湾话和广东话为母语的人，普通话中的 「干 」字带有一点粗俗的含义，尽管这并不一定是暗指 「干」。
注4： 参见CNN Staff, “’He Understood Me:’ Death of China’s Former Premier Sparks Mourning – and a Way to Air Frustration with Xi Era,” CNN, updated Nov. 8, 2023, 可参照下列网址https://www.cnn .com/2023/11/01/china/china-li-keqiang-death-xi-discontent-intl-hnk/index.html.
注5 ：讽刺的是, 习近平在 2014 年，自己引用了「天视自我民视，天听自我民听」。 (http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2014-09/21/c_1112564804.htm)这是因为儒家思想赋予国家合法性，就像西方的基督教在康斯坦丁/狄奥多西之后一样。 虽然有些人将儒家传统与专制主义混淆在一起，其中最显著的可能是新加坡的李光耀，在20世纪80年代和90年代提倡的 「亚洲价值观 」辩论中的论点。但完整理解儒家思想后，会发现儒学是反专制的。然而，中国的法家思想，是一种极权意识形态的原型。可以说，中共政权是第一个统一中国的朝代秦以来，最符合法家的政权，秦朝以法家思想为国家意识形态。 汉朝声称天命所归，推翻了秦朝。 实际上，汉朝以及后来的每个朝代都保留了法家的控制方法，同时受到温良的儒家思想影响。 （请参阅《唐律》，当中严厉的刑罚受到儒家思想而变得柔性。例如，考虑到孩子独立生命的利益，孕妇不能被处死，这一点同样反映在《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》中。）习近平在2014年的这段话可以在这样的背景下来解释，也就是采用儒家思想来为马克思、列宁、毛泽东等法家的管治体系披上合法的外衣，这也可以从中国共产党利用孔子学院作为海外软实力的延伸，或者从中国电视节目《当马克思遇上孔子》中所看到的。但当研究中国共产党的思想家，尤其是王沪宁，他影响了自江泽民以来的每一位中共领导人，我们就会发现他们所汲取的传统管治观念主要是源于法家。 有关中共试图利用儒家思想来进行潜在颠覆性结果的讨论，请见Michael Schuman, Why a Confucian Revival and the Internet Can Have Unexpected Consequences for China, Brookings, Mar. 4, 2015, 可参照下列网址https:// www.brookings.edu/articles/why-a-confucian-revival-and-the-internet-could-have-unexpected-consequences-for-china/
注6 ：我曾写过一篇关于李登辉时期，台湾民主化与宪政改革的文章。可参考Piero Tozzi, Constitutional Reform on Taiwan: Fulfilling a Chinese Notion of Democratic Sovereignty?, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1193 (1995), available at https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=3228&context=flr
注7 ：本次讨论参考了下列资料：Anita Andrew and Robert André LaFleur, “Remonstrance: The Moral Imperative of a Chinese Scholar-Official,” Education About Asia (Fall 2014).
注8 ：部分内容摘录于 https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/confucian-approach-human-rights-0。为了说明权利和义务的相互影响，可参考以下情况： 父母有义务提供未成年子女的需求（食物、住所、教育）。 子女有权期待接收如此的义务。相对来说，子女对父母有服从的义务，而父母也有权利期望子女服从。
注9：参照 Hans Ingevar Roth, P.C. Chang and Charles Malik: The Two Philosophers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 45 Human Rights Quarterly No. 4 (2023).
Original Text
Future China Forum—-Reflections on the 75th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China: Democracy, Human Rights and the Chinese Tradition
By Piero A. Tozzi （注1）
As we approach the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it is appropriate to reflect upon how under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the PRC has departed from norms – and not just international norms, but norms historically known in China as well.
Ideological Challenges to the Legitimacy of CCP Rule?
In 2012, roughly contemporaneous with the rise of Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the CCP and thereby to a position of paramount leadership, a document known as “Document Number 9” (中辦發〔2013〕9號) circulated among the upper echelons of the CCP. More formally known to English speakers variously as Briefing on the Current Situation in the Ideological Field or Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere (关于当前意识形态领域情况的通报), （注2） Document Number 9 asserts that there are a number of ideological threats emanating from the West that challenge the CCP’s control of China and the legitimacy of its right to rule. Among the threats it identifies as emanating from the West are “constitutional democracy” – including the principles of “separation of powers” and “general elections” – and the notion of “universal values,” understood as something that “defies time and space, transcends nation and class, and applies to all humanity.”
Implicit in this is an assumption that such principles – democracy, constitutional governance, and respect for human rights – are alien to the Chinese tradition and therefore must be rejected. But while one can concede that such ideas do constitute a threat to the CCP’s narrative of legitimacy and the right to rule – and hooray for that – are such ideas and ideals alien to the Chinese tradition? Or are they consonant with a Chinese tradition that views the interests of the people as paramount, and above those who claim the mantle of a right to rule?
The Significance of the Death of Li Keqiang
Until he unexpectedly died from an apparent cardiac incident while swimming in October last year at 68 years of age – young by the standards of Chinese leaders – former premier Li Keqiang (李克強) was viewed as a reformist, especially when viewed in comparison with Xi Jinping. While one should caveat that he was neither a saint, nor a democrat, but rather a high ranking Communist and member of Politburo, he did advocate policies that stood in marked contrast from those of Xi, and did garner a certain amount of popular acclaim during his lifetime, which manifested itself in outpourings of grief following his passing.
What is most significant, however, and particularly germane to my presentation, is a speech he gave prior to his demise, where he cited a meaning-laden proverb: “Men act, and Heaven watches.” (“人在干，天在看”). （注3）
While certain Western media sources have correctly understood this to be an implicit challenge to Xi Jinping – CNN somewhat blandly referred to it as “a veiled reminder that leader’s actions will be judged by history” – its deeper significance isn’t fully conveyed by such a surface reading.（注4） Contextualized more deeply, Li’s words could be interpreted as calling for the overthrow – and even death – of a tyrant who oppressed the people and had lost the right to rule, the vaunted “Mandate of Heaven” (天命).
Overthrowing a Tyrant, and Nascent Notions of Democracy
Li’s appeal to Heaven echoes a saying of great antiquity, that “Heaven sees with the eyes of the people, and hears with the ears of the people.” (“天视自我民视，天听自我民听”)
Originally appearing in the Book of Documents (书经), its most notable citation is in a passage of the greatest disciple of Confucius, Mencius, who lived during the Warring States period (fourth to third century BC).
Per Mencius, the interests of the people were paramount, ahead of those of the ruler: “The people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler.” (「民为贵，社稷次之，君为轻。」——《孟子·尽心下》章句十四) The mandate to rule was a qualified right: “If the prince made serious mistakes, they would remonstrate with him, but if repeated remonstrations fell on deaf ears, they would depose him…. the King [King Hsuan of Ch’i] blenched at this.” (「君有大过则谏，反覆之而不听，则易位矣……宣王变色。 」——《孟子·梁惠王下》章)
In other words, the overthrow of a government, and a ruler, is justified in the Chinese tradition. Mencius clarifies, however, what would justify such a radical step – the descent of a king and his government into rapacious tyranny, whereby morality is mutilated: “A man who mutilates benevolence is a mutilator, while one who cripples rightness is a crippler. He who is both a mutilator and a crippler is an ‘outcast.’ I have indeed heard of the punishment of the ‘outcast Tchou,’ but I have not heard of any regicide.” (孟子说：「贼仁者谓之贼，贼义者谓之残。残贼之人谓之一夫。闻诛一夫纣矣，未闻弑君也。」——《孟子·梁惠王下》章)
In such cases, tyrannicide is justified, which should not be confused with regicide, because a tyrant no longer has authority to rule, and his (mis)rule is only based on the raw exercise of power and random application of positive law, unlike a king, whose rule is legitimate.
Thus what then are the marks of a tyrant? One who disregards the law-above-the-law – the Tao (道) – and oppresses the people, for “Heaven sees with the eyes of the people, and hears with the ears of the people.” Such a ruler has lost the Mandate of Heaven, and his rule is no longer legitimate. He may thus be both deposed and disposed of. (Interestingly, St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13th Century AD is asked the same question, and comes up with a parallel answer, grounded in the Natural Law.)
In Mencius, one can discern ideas that are best described as “proto-democratic:” while the rule of a monarch is assumed, he has a reciprocal duty to rule with the interests of the people foremost in mind. Indeed, as noted above, Mencius specifies that in the proper ordering of priorities, the people must come first; next, the Grains and Altars (i.e., responsibility for which resides with the State), and last, the ruler.
Moreover, while the modern language of “human rights” would have been alien to Mencius, the concept of human dignity is very much evident, as is the Confucian concept of “benevolence” (仁). Contra Document Number 9, far from being a Western imposition, these are concepts that have very deep roots in the Chinese tradition.
When the popular Li Keqiang invoked the idea that Heaven observes the conduct of rulers, it is thus likely that Xi Jinping perceived that to be a direct challenge; while some have speculated that Li’s death did not come about by natural causes, there is no publicly available evidence as of yet to suggest that Xi played a direct or indirect role in his demise.（注5）
Chinese Democracy and Constitutional Governance – the Model of the Republic of China on Taiwan
But of course if one wants to make an easy rebuttal of the CCP’s claims that democracy and constitutional governance are inimical to the Chinese political tradition, one need only to point to Taiwan, which perhaps why the CCP is so intent on trying to bully this independent democracy into submission. The direct popular election of Lee Teng-hui (李登辉) in 1996 as President should forever give lie to the claim that general elections are alien to the Sinosphere. （注6）
But what of constitutional governance, and separation of power, which are also pilloried in Document Number 9 as alien to the Chinese tradition? Interestingly, when Sun Yat-sen envisioned a constitution for the Republic of China (中华民国), he rejected the Western notion of a three-branch government, in favor of a five-branch model (五权分立), which he asserted was rooted in part in China’s imperial past. (This five-branch model is also reflected in the Republic of China’s 1947 Constitution, which is what governs Taiwan today.)
In addition to the three branches familiar to the West (legislative, executive and judicial), the Constitution of the ROC adds two: an Examination Yuan (考试院) and a Control Yuan (监察院). Why is that?
Dr. Sun’s point was that both the meritocratic selection of officials and this oversight function are rooted in China’s past. Contrary to the notion that the imperial system was purely autocratic, a scholar-official class (士大夫) schooled in the Confucian classics and selected through a meritocratic examination system regardless of class background (at least in theory), served as a check on imperial power, and thereby provided an oversight function. The emperor’s power was never quite absolute (皇帝的权力不是 绝对的) – absolutists who descended into tyranny were subject to being overthrown, as discussed above – and scholar-officials had a moral obligation to remonstrate against unjust conduct by the emperor, though in pushing back against imperial overreach, sometimes dedicated scholar-officials were “risking their lives in remonstrance” (谏死).
This duty of remonstration is grounded in the Confucian concept of filial piety (孝): “As they serve their fathers, so they serve their rulers, and they reverence them equally.” (资于事父以事君，而敬同) In the Classic of Filial Piety (孝經) Confucius states “when a case of unrighteous conduct is concerned, a son must by no means keep from remonstrating with his father, not a minister from remonstrating with his ruler.” (父有争子，则身不陷于不义。故当不义，则子不可以不争于父，臣不可以不争于君；故当不义，则争之) （注7）
Thus while the imperial system did not have a constitution per se, insofar as a system of checks and balances existed historically, this could be understood as a form of organic constitutionalism, consonant with the Chinese tradition. (To this day the United Kingdom does not have a written, standalone constitution either, yet that does not mean the United Kingdom does not have a constitution.) Thus this form of constitutionalism, though rejected by the CCP, is not alien to the Chinese tradition. Indeed, it gave rise to the Constitution of the Republic of
China, a modern enactment of this concept of constitutionalism, and one which could serve as a model for a future China once China is rid of Communist Party dictatorship.
Universal Human Rights
While one might debate whether Confucianism, with principles analogous to Natural Law theory in the West, “defies time and space, transcends nation and class, and applies to all humanity” – I would say that it does, and indeed could be studied and applied to the universal benefit of humanity – a more topical discussion concerns whether the principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (世界人权宣言) of 1948, or UDHR, are somehow inimical to the Chinese tradition, as Document Number 9 asserts, as opposed to inimical to the totalitarian conceits of the Chinese Communist Party.
To answer that, one needs to recall how the drafters of the UDHR, in seeking to create a declaration that was truly universal, drew from Chinese, and particularly, Confucian, sources.
In advance of the drafting of the UDHR, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, or UNESCO, under the leadership of the Thomistic philosopher Jacques Maritain, surveyed the philosophical underpinnings of the concept of human rights. Lo Chung-shu (罗忠恕) contributed an essay entitled “Human Rights in the Chinese Tradition,” which noted that while a modern vocabulary of “rights” did not exist in the tradition, a concept of “rights” in reciprocity with mutual obligations, or duties, owed to one’s neighbor certainly did exist.（注8）
Indeed, included among eight members on the drafting committee for the UDHR was P.C. Chang (张彭春), a representative of the Republic of China and vice chair of the convening U.N. Commission on Human Rights, whose thinking reflected Confucian conceptions of rights and duties, as well as a less individualistic, more communitarian understanding of how such rights could be exercised. （注9）
A Confucian influence can be seen, for example, in the reference to duty contained in Article 29(1): “Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.” (人人对社会负有义务,因为只有在社会中他的个性才可能得到自由和充分的发展). P.C. Chang’s alternate at the negotiations of the UDHR, John Wu (吴经熊), also had a very developed sense of the natural law, a perspective he shared with drafters such as Charles Malik and Maritain, reflective of Wu’s dual, complementary Catholic and Confucian sensibilities.
Thus there is a certain irony in Document Number 9’s fleeing from a landmark human rights document that is consonant with, and in significant part reflects, a traditional Chinese world view. Perhaps what the PRC’s communist leadership fears is that if the CCP were held to account for its well-documented abuses of human rights under standards contained in the UDHR,
it would be found to be in violation of not just international norms, but norms historically known in China as well.
Who will Bring Human Rights and Democracy to China?
One thing that needs to be emphasized is that any change to a democratic system of government in China must come from the Chinese people. (中国的民主改革必须从你们开始。) It is not the business of the United States government to bring about regime change; change cannot come from the outside but from you, representatives of the Chinese people. (不是从外面,也不是从美国。中国的民主 改革从中国人开始 。)
But for our part we – the United States – need to stop making stability, which is support of the existing regime, paramount. We cannot side with the Communist Chinese Party against the Chinese people. (我们不能跟中国共产党站在一起,然后对抗中国人民。)
We – the American government, American businesses – need to stop subsidizing tyranny. (另外,国会与美国政府、美国企业以及西方企业必须停止对暴政的补助。)
For example, last year the Congressional Executive Commission on China held a hearing entitled from Bait to Plate: How Forced Labor in China Taints America’s Seafood Supply Chain. U.S. Government food procurement programs purchased some $200 million worth of seafood over a five-year period from tainted Chinese sources, including fish purchased by the Defense Department’s Defense Logistics Agency served on U.S. military bases, and U.S. Department of Agriculture purchases for the federally-subsidized National School Lunch Program.
In so doing, the U.S. government violated at least three U.S. laws—section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (banning all goods produced with forced labor), the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (banning goods made with Uyghur forced labor), and the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA (banning goods made by North Korean forced labor), given that the PRC fishing industry utilizes both Uyghurs transhipped from the Uyghur Autonomous Region and North Korean workers either in catching the fish or processing it.
American businesses, for their part, need to likewise cleanse their supply chains of goods made with forced labor. Indeed, they must – it’s the law.
Fundamentally, we need to reexamine much of the presuppositions which undergirded America’s policy towards post-Mao, “Reform Era” China. The idea that China’s participation in the rules-based international order and its accompanying liberal trade regime would foster the development of rule of law in China and eventual political liberalization has proven to be a “fantasy,” to borrow James Mann’s turn-of-phrase.
Indeed, the very notion that a centralized, command economy, where the government subsidizes favored export industries, steals intellectual property, and artificially lowers prices by utilizing slave labor, can somehow be integrated into a global free trade system is an absurdity, a point forcefully made by Miles Yu (余茂春).
Yet the PRC’s growing economic power has allowed it to present a systemic alternative to this rules-based order, one which subordinates universal human rights norms to the CCP’s political and ideological dictates. We must resist that.
We collectively need to push back on the CCP’s assertion, in Document number 9 and elsewhere, that democracy, constitutional government and respect for human rights is not part of Chinese tradition. It is a claim that is contradicted by Chinese voices, not only contemporary voices but past voices drawn from the great patrimony and inheritance of China.
Rather, if one ignores the static emanating from the CCP and listens carefully, they will hear those authentic voices of the Chinese people say, “Democracy will prevail.” (民主必胜)
Thank you.
September 23，2024
Footnote
1）Piero A. Tozzi is the Staff Director of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC). This an amplification of remarks delivered at the Chinese Democracy Forum held at the Capitol Visitor’s Center in Washington DC on September 23, 2024. The views expressed herein are his own and not necessarily those of the CECC. The author thanks “Ms. Huang” (黃小姐) and AW for their input and review, and thanks Anna Wang for the invitation to address the forum.
2） An analysis and translation of Document No. 9 is available at https://ia801406.us.archive.org/2/items/document-no.-9/Document%20No.%209.pdf.
3） To the ears of southern Chinese – especially those who are native speakers of Hokkien/Taiwanese and Cantonese – the word “干” when used in Mandarin has a somewhat vulgar connotation, though that is not necessarily implied.
4）See CNN Staff, “’He Understood Me:’ Death of China’s Former Premier Sparks Mourning – and a Way to Air Frustration with Xi Era,” CNN, updated Nov. 8, 2023, available at https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/01/china/china-li-keqiang-death-xi-discontent-intl-hnk/index.html.
5） Ironically, Xi Jinping in 2014 had himself quoted the passage regarding Heaven seeing with the eyes of the people. (http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2014-09/21/c_1112564804.htm) This is because Confucianism bestows legitimacy upon the State, much as Christianity did in the West post-Constantine/Theodosius. While some have conflated the Confucian tradition with authoritarianism – perhaps most notably, Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore in the “Asian values” debate of the 1980s and 90s – Confucianism properly understood is anti-authoritarian. Chinese Legalism (法家), however, is a proto-totalitarian ideology; arguably the CCP regime is the most Legalist regime since the first dynasty to unify China, the Qin (秦), which adopted Legalism as a State ideology. The Han (汉) overthrew the Qin using Confucianism as justification, claiming that the Mandate of Heaven had passed onto them. In reality, the Han and every succeeding dynasty kept Legalist methods of control in place, albeit ameliorated by benign Confucianism. (See for example, the Tang Code, where harsh penalties are softened by a Confucian influence: A pregnant woman could not be put to death, given the independent life interest of the child – something that is similarly reflected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.) Xi Jinping’s 2014 quote should be seen in the context of adopting the mantle of Confucianism to garb a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist – and Legalist – system of governance with legitimacy, as can be seen with using Confucius Institutes as an extension of the CCP’s soft power abroad, or in the Chinese television program, When Marx met Confucius. But when one studies CCP ideologues – notably, Wang Huning (王沪宁), who has influenced every CCP leader since Jiang Zemin – one can see that the traditional notion of governance that they draw upon is predominantly Legalist. For a discussion of the potentially subversive outcome of the CCP’s attempt to enlist Confucianism in its service, see Michael Schuman, Why a Confucian Revival and the Internet Can Have Unexpected Consequences for China, Brookings, Mar. 4, 2015, available at https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-a-confucian-revival-and-the-internet-could-have-unexpected-consequences-for-china/
6） I previously wrote about democratization and constitutional reform in Taiwan during the Lee Tung-hui era. Piero Tozzi, Constitutional Reform on Taiwan: Fulfilling a Chinese Notion of Democratic Sovereignty?, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1193 (1995), available at https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3228&context=flr
7）This discussion is informed by Anita Andrew and Robert André LaFleur, “Remonstrance: The Moral Imperative of a Chinese Scholar-Official,” Education About Asia (Fall 2014).
8） Excerpted in part at https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/confucian-approach-human-rights-0. To illustrate the mutual interplay of rights and duties, consider the following: A parent has a duty to provide for a minor child’s needs (food, shelter, education). A child has a right to expect that. Reciprocally, a child owes a parent a duty of obedience, which a parent has a right to expect.
9） See Hans Ingevar Roth, P.C. Chang and Charles Malik: The Two Philosophers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 45 Human Rights Quarterly No. 4 (2023).
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