民间档案馆China Unofficial ArchivesApr 2

 

溃坝后的板桥水库。

作者：Adam

By Adam

The English translation follows below.

 

1975年8月初，先后在台湾花莲与福建晋江两度登陆的7503号台风，并没有在这两地造成巨大损失。没人想到，几天后，它会在内陆中原引发罕见强降雨，62座位于河南境内的水库溃坝，决堤而出的洪水冲过原野和城市，加上瘟疫，夺走数万生命，成为人类历史上惨痛的一页。

这是一场当时没有任何报道的灾难。1975年正值中国文革，“阶级斗争”为纲，政治运动挂帅，对灾难的应急响应十分迟滞，救援物资也极度匮乏。部分官方史料称死亡人数超过8万人，但一些民间研究认为，死亡人数远超这个数字，相当多的人死于灾后蔓延的疾疫之中。

河南驻马店是这场大洪水中的重灾区，也是我的家乡。童年时的我，常听父亲说，当年洪水来临的时候，他只有10岁，因正值暑假，去了新乡他的外婆家，才躲过了这场劫难。而我的舅老爷一家，新建的房子半夜被大水冲走，全家人因邻居大声喊叫惊醒，才逃到距离不远、地势稍高的马路上，得以幸存。而另一户人家，则没有那么幸运，四个孩子中，有两个被洪水冲走……如今，51年过去了，这些记忆，存在于家乡父老的偶尔闲谈中，但极少被官方历史提及。2020年起，我回到故乡，寻访亲友，也通过有限的文史资料，试图去了解自己家乡这段惨痛的历史。

罕见大雨中，62座水坝相继垮塌

大洪水发生的原因之一，是极端的暴雨天气，但溃坝导致的数万人死亡，却难逃人祸的影子。

根据当时的气象记载，7503号台风在晋江登陆之后，气流逐步转向北方。与所有深入内陆的台风一样，它的强度逐渐减弱。到8月6日凌晨，它抵达此次的最西点——湖南常德境内。但由于南半球的寒潮活动导致跨赤道气流等特殊气象，7503号台风的低压系统，在陆地上罕见维持了足足百余小时。空前巨量的水汽由千里之外的大海长驱直入，从5号到8号，在河南南部造成了三轮灾难性的强降雨。

根据作家钱钢在《世界最大的水库垮坝惨案——1975年驻马店大水》一文中记录，这场暴雨，“降水强度极强，在暴雨中心——位于板桥水库的林庄，最大6小时雨量为830毫米，超过了当时世界最高记录（美国宾洲密士港，1942年）的782毫米；最大24小时雨量为1060毫米，也创造了我国同类指标的最高记录。”

暴雨肆虐之时，河南境内的板桥、石漫滩两座大型水库，以及竹沟、田岗两座中型水库，还有58座小型水库，在短短数小时内相继垮坝溃决。驻马店、许昌（含1986年后独立出来的漯河市）、周口、南阳和舞阳工区（今平顶山代管的舞钢市），以及河南这5个地区的30个县市，还有毗邻的安徽阜阳临泉县都遭受了洪灾。

根据《河南省驻马店地区75·8抗洪志》（驻马店地区水利局组织编撰，1998年由黄河水利出版社出版）记载，溃坝发生在午夜时分，当时人们正在睡梦中。石漫滩水库的溃坝是1975年8月8日零时，十分钟后，板桥水库相继垮塌。

事实上，在这两座大型水库垮塌之前，8月7日晚上21时之前，在确山、泌阳两地已有7座小型水库溃坝；22时，中型水库竹沟水库溃坝。此时，遂平县城内水深已齐腰。板桥水库垮坝后，距水库最近的沙河店镇首先被大水吞噬，全镇6000余人中至少有827人遇难。而与沙河店镇一河之隔的文城公社，因为听不到河对岸在比划什么，也错过了自救的机会，伤亡惨重。

据记载，板桥水库的垮坝涌波，以平均约每秒6米的流速顺流而下，在溃坝后三个小时左右已漫流到遂平县，水流扩宽至10公里。遂平县城附近的平地水深在4．5米左右，京广铁路线遂平车站的铁轨水深就约3米。

从一些记载中能看到，当大水已吞噬村庄，进入城市时，有效的救援还没开始。时任副总理纪登奎的儿子纪坡民，曾在《我所了解的“1975年河南水灾”》一文中写道：

“8月8日晚，我父亲和刘建勋（时任河南省第一书记）还在洛阳（解决大企业文革派性斗争问题），省委副书记、省革委生产指挥部指挥长王维群突然打来电话报告，驻马店地区板桥水库出事了！因通信中断，具体情况还不清楚。我父亲和刘建勋当即连夜返回郑州，听取汇报，了解情况，安排布置抗洪救灾，向中央报告，要求派军队支援。”

可见，大雨持续了数天，河南省委既没有预见到灾难性降雨溃坝的可能，还在洛阳忙文革派性斗争问题，得知板桥水库溃坝时，已过了整整将近一整天，且具体情况还不清楚。

据钱钢记述，1975年8月9日8时，驻马店地委曾发出特急电报——“我区5日至8日连降特大暴雨，平均降雨量800毫米，平均积水2米左右，一片汪洋，板桥水库8日0时40分垮坝，遂平县城被淹没，有许多人死亡。由于暴雨洪水造成严重灾害，300多万人被洪水包围，有的被困在房顶、树上已有两、三天，万分危急！”

除了大洪灾的凶猛，钱钢从驻马店地区的档案资料中查到一部分残缺不全的电话记录、情况通报。这些原始记录，披露了水库垮坝后，驻马店人于水深火热中的悲惨景况：

“8月13日——新蔡、平舆东部水仍上涨，1小时2公分，全区200万人在水中；汝南：10万人被淹(指尚飘浮在水中)，已救4万，还有6万人困在树上，要求急救；全县20万人脸肿腿肿，拉肚子，无药……一直到8月16日，全地区120万人还在水里。洪水过后，发病率迅速上升，次生灾难严重，除了疾病，也没有食物，有的地方仍在堤上吃小虫吃树叶……”

“社会主义高潮”中兴建的水库

其实，这场旷世灾难，早在1957年大跃进期间就埋下了影子。据钱钢文章记述，1950年代初，河南曾加固板桥、石漫滩两座水库。在这两所水库扩建后，大跃进开始了，“中原地区的水库建设蜂拥而上，一发而不可止。”“仅1957-1959年，驻马店地区就修建水库100多座。一大批新水库的催生婆，是正轰鸣于中国大地的‘社会主义高潮’”。

据记述，在大跃进中的1958年，河南总结了漭河流域兴建山区水利的经验。当时的国务院副总理谭震林来河南视察时，将其归纳为“以蓄为主，以小型为主，以社队自办为主”，并说：“现在山区问题解决了，要把漭河经验向平原推广。”水利专家陈惺曾当即指出：在平原地区以蓄为主，重蓄轻排，会对水域环境造成严重破坏等等。但这位专家的忠告无人理会，还被打成右倾分子下放。“以蓄为主”的经验后来被大范围推广到安徽，丘陵地区涌现大批小水库，造成淮河流域后来数十年间致命的“肠梗阻”症。

陈惺后来曾在《治水无止境》一书中总结，河南洪灾的主要原因之一，是1949年之后水利建设规划决策的失误。包括：重蓄轻排导致设计的排水闸不足，以及1950年代后大跃进式的水利建设，大量存在质量隐患，没有及时排除。事实上，大跃进时期，大量中小型水库水坝本身，就是政治产物，从设计到质量都缺乏严谨的规划与施工。

文革背景之下，尴尬的防汛

今天回望能看到，文革中，河南和全国各省一样，干部们忙于应对各种政治运动，在防汛方面，完全缺少避险意识和物资准备。

举一个例子——根据于为民、叶树鑫《75.8浩劫内幕纪实》（1990年由黄河文艺出版社出版）披露，8月6日，驻马店地区革命委员会的生产指挥部指挥长刘培诚，前往板桥视察，曾召集水库管理局、板桥公社和驻军负责人联席会议，部署抗洪抢险：有的主张加高大堤，有的主张炸开副坝泄洪，减轻对大坝的压力。各种意见相持不下，会议延续了一个多小时，直到最后，人们才突然发现，有关抗洪抢险的一切方案都无法实施。水库革委会副主任尴尬地告诉大家：防汛仓库里没有铁锹、草袋，更没有一两炸药，只有几根小木棍和几只民兵训练用的木柄手榴弹。

事实上，这场巨大的灾难并非没有防范的可能。根据谌旭彬《中国当代最惨溃坝事故，当年媒体无只字报道》文中介绍，8月6日23时，板桥水库的水位已经高达122.91米，而设计规定的最高蓄水位只有110.88米，主溢洪道闸门抬高出水面，输水道也于7日凌晨1时全部打开泄洪，但水位仍在急剧上涨。当时有人建议全部开闸泄洪，甚至扒开口子泻洪，但根本无人愿意承担责任，给出决策。

事实上，1975年的驻马店，深陷在文革的浩劫之中，山头林立，各派力量忙于内斗，防汛事务早被抛到了九霄云外。

消失于报端的“75·8”大洪水：不能让毛主席周总理受刺激

如此巨大的灾难，1975年的中国媒体没有半个字的报道。多年之后，新华社记者张广友在《炎黄春秋》发文披露了其中的部分内幕：

慰问团长、国务院副总理纪登奎，我们过去就认识。他平易近人，很关心记者，关心宣传报道。在慰问团到达灾区之后，他曾经几次同我交谈。他说：“这次中央慰问团既是慰问团，又是‘工作团’。在做好慰问工作的同时，要尽可能地协助地方政府做些工作，解决抗洪抢险和救灾工作中的一些实际问题。”

我问纪登奎：这次水灾如何报道？他说：“中央领导已经决定这次水灾不作公开报道，不发消息，特别是灾情不仅不作公开报道，而且还要保密。”我对此不理解，当即反问：为什么？这么大范围的大水灾能保住密吗？他说：“这是中央领导的决定，已经告诉你们总社领导了，但这不是说你们就没有什么事儿了。你们的任务，不仅是同慰问团一道去灾区现场进行慰问；而且还要搞些内参，宣传抗洪抢救中的先进人物、先进事迹，如：舍己为人，舍小家顾大家，一方遇灾，八方支援的共产主义风格等；特别是要抓住一些重要问题深人实际，做些调查研究……”

80年代初，纪登奎从中央领导岗位下来之后，到国务院农村发展研究中心工作，我们经常见面。有一次在闲谈中我们说起那次水灾不让公开报道和那份调查报告的事儿，他说：不叫公开报道是怕产生副作用，影响稳定；那个时候正是毛主席和周总理重病期间，不让公开报道，也是怕他们受刺激，内部报道也只能选择极少量给他们看，这种内部报道不会给他们看的；至于那份调查报告我看到了，是一份很有说服力的好材料，但是，已经顾不上了……”

——（张广友，《目睹1975年淮河大水灾》，载《炎黄春秋》）

原来，当时官方对这场大灾难不仅不公开，反而要求保密的一个重要原因，是怕“影响稳定”，尤其是因为毛主席和周总理病重，“不能让他们受刺激”。

到底死了多少人？本地记忆与独立的历史记录匮乏

2005年，美国《探索频道》把这场大洪灾称为世界“十大人为技术灾难”之一。但在中国，因为长期的人为屏蔽，知道这场灾难的人一直寥寥。

大洪灾过去14年之后，1989年7月，由前中国水利部部长钱正英作序的《中国历史大洪水（上）》一书，以“内部发行版”的形式出版，书中首次从官方角度披露了部分灾情。

该书披露，在“75·8”大洪灾中，河南省有29个县市、1700万亩农田被淹，其中1100万亩农田受到毁灭性的灾害，1100万人受灾，26000多人死难，致使纵贯中国大陆北京至广州的铁路(京广线)冲毁102公里，中断行车18天，影响运输48天，直接经济损失近百亿元。

1990年3月，河南日报记者于为民，叶树鑫出版了报告文学《75·8劫难纪实》，作为公开出版物，较为完整的呈现了灾情，成为第一本关于“75·8”洪水的专著。

近年来，带着对那一段历史的好奇，我在河南当地搜寻关于这场大洪灾的记录。发现与之有关的著作很少。其中官方编著的书，除了前述由驻马店地区水利局编著的《“75·8”抗洪志》；还有中央党史研究室，中央档案馆2002年编著的《1975年淮河大水灾亲历记》（《中共党史资料第84辑》）；以及河南水利厅2005年7月编《河南“75·8”特大洪水灾害》。

在地方上，豫南各市县政协整理的《文史资料》，如《驻马店文史资料》，在第四、第八和第九辑上，有“75·8”洪水专题，主要是曾在政府部门工作的救灾参与者的回忆征集。

在周口市项城的档案馆，有县委卷宗记录了这次“抗洪”，还有一套项城县抗洪救灾指挥部编印的《抗洪救灾报》。这份报纸是项城唯一一套关于“抗洪救灾”的地方报纸。2010年，项城市政协资料编辑部根据这些资料，和当年抗洪救灾亲历者的回忆，编辑整理出了一本《项城75·8抗洪救灾资料集》（张甫堂刘雅君，周口日报）。

这些由水利部门主持编纂的档案，更多是围绕气象水文如何影响工程，导致灾难，以及最终如何恢复水利工程，也涉及如何组织救灾和恢复生产，但都是从国家角度。是国家权力意志的叙述，而少见对灾难深层原因的反思。

2010年前后，中国媒体曾有较为短暂的一个宽松时期，当时有南方周末、南方都市报、炎黄春秋等媒体，通过报道提供了一些丰富的细节，尤其是在2010年大洪灾发生35周年之时。

自媒体兴起后，逐渐有了一些以普通人为主体，第一人称视角的回忆。一些参与救灾的老兵，例如来自武汉军区舟桥部队的老兵，也有一些是医护人员的回忆，但更多来自本地亲历者的记忆依然十分稀缺。

2021年7月，河南再次发生严重水灾，据报道，有13座水库告急。我痛心地看到，在我的家乡，曾经历过“758”惨痛水灾的河南人，依然缺乏准备与避险意识。从应急响应到未能及时通报泄洪，瞒报遇难数字等等，似乎又在重复46年前的“75·8”洪水暴露出的问题（参见《河南郑州“7·20”特大暴雨灾害调查报告》）。

这场文革中发生的旷世洪灾到底死了多少人？至今，还是一个谜。

根据《纪登奎、乌兰夫慰问驻马店水灾》一文（刊登于驻马店《文史资料》第二辑，作者魏世昌）记载，8月15日，中央慰问团在当地影剧院召开慰问大会，时任副总理纪登奎出席这次大会。其间，纪登奎将地委书记苏华和地委副书记魏世昌叫去，询问这次洪灾可能死了多少人，两人报告说“可能死十多万人。”——这也是有据可查的汇报给中央的第一个死亡统计数字。

8月20日，也即溃坝后12天，根据河南省委初步统计的数字，全省死亡85600多人，连同外地在灾区死亡的人数在内，最多不超过10万人。当时河南省委认为这个数字比较准确。中央慰问团在写给中央的关于河南、安徽灾情报告中，引用了这个数字。

但前述新华社记者张广友曾随中央慰问团第一时间深入灾区采访，他认为原先报的85000人的数字多了，最多不超过4万人，这个数字和官方数字接近。而在《河南省驻马店地区75·8抗洪志》一书第83页，当地水利局给出的数据是，在驻马店地区，“淹死22564人，病死1633人，受伤92096人”。

2005年美国《探索》频道的节目，以及一些民间的说法，则认为死亡人数超过20万。这个数字，不仅包括垮坝当晚熟睡中的直接受难者，也包括几天后爆破泄洪、分洪的受难者，还有灾后瘟疫蔓延，以及饥饿等死去的人。

51年过去了，可以确定的一件事情是，直到今天，因为中国的相关信息并不公开透明，这场大洪灾中真正的死亡人数，依然成谜。

 

推荐档案：

《中国历史大洪水》（上）

《河南省驻马店地区75.8抗洪志》

《项城75.8抗洪救灾资料集》

《75.8浩劫内幕纪实》

延伸阅读：

钱钢：世界最大的水库垮坝惨案——1975年驻马店大水

江华、喻尘：水墓：河南“1975.8”特大洪水祭（2010年南方都市报）

腾讯历史：中国当代最惨溃坝事故，当年媒体无只字报道

 

【作者观点不代表中国民间档案馆立场。】

 

The “75.8” Flood in Henan— A Disaster Masked Amidst the Chaos of the Cultural Revolution

 

By Adam

 

The Banqiao Dam after the flood.

 

In early August 1975, Typhoon No. 7503, which made landfall twice in Hualien, Taiwan, and Jinjiang, Fujian, did not cause significant losses at first. No one imagined that, a few days later, it would trigger a rare and torrential downpour in China’s inland central plains. Sixty-two dams located within Henan Province breached; the floodwaters that burst through the dikes swept across fields and cities.

This disaster, known in the west as the Banqiao Dam failure, received no media coverage at the time. 1975 was during China’s Cultural Revolution, where class struggle was the guiding principle and political movements took command. The emergency response to the disaster was sluggish, and relief supplies were desperately scarce. Some official sources put the death toll at over 80,000, but unofficial investigations have shown that the death toll may far exceed this figure, as many perished from diseases as a result of the flood.

Zhumadian, Henan Province, was the hardest-hit area in this great flood and is also my hometown. As a child, I often heard my father say that when the flood arrived that year, he was only 10 years old. Because it was summer vacation, he had gone to his grandmother’s house in Xinxiang and thus escaped the catastrophe. However, the newly built house of my great-uncle’s family was swept away by the flood in the middle of the night. The whole family woke up because a neighbor shouted loudly, allowing them to escape to a road not far away on slightly higher ground and survive. Another family was not so lucky; of their four children, two were swept away by the flood. Today, 51 years have passed, and these memories exist in the occasional small talk of the village elders back home, but are rarely mentioned in official history. Starting in 2020, I returned to my hometown, visiting relatives and friends, and also attempted to understand this tragic history of my hometown through limited literary and historical materials.

62 Dams Collapsed One After Another Amid Torrential Rain

One cause of the great flood was the rainstorm and the unusual meteorological conditions that enabled it to penetrate so deep inland. But the deaths of tens of thousands, especially due to the dam breaches, were caused by humans.

According to meteorological records at the time, after Typhoon No. 7503 landed in Jinjiang, the airflow gradually turned north. Like all typhoons that penetrate deep inland, its intensity gradually weakened. By the early morning of August 6, it reached its westernmost point—the vicinity of Changde, Hunan. However, due to special meteorological conditions such as cross-equatorial airflow caused by cold wave activity in the Southern Hemisphere, the low-pressure system was able to remain at typhoon-level winds on land for a full hundred-plus hours. An unprecedented and massive amount of water vapor drove straight in from the sea thousands of miles away, causing three rounds of catastrophic torrential rain in southern Henan from the 5th to the 8th.

According to records in the article “The World’s Largest Reservoir Dam Breach Tragedy — The 1975 Zhumadian Flood” by the writer Qian Gang, this rainstorm’s “precipitation intensity was extremely strong. At the center of the storm — Linzhuang, located at the Banqiao Reservoir — the maximum 6-hour rainfall was 830 mm, exceeding the world record at the time (782 mm in Smethport, Pennsylvania, USA in 1942); the maximum 24-hour rainfall was 1060 mm, which also created the highest record for similar indicators in our country.”

While the rainstorm raged, two large reservoirs in Henan, Banqiao and Shimantan, as well as two medium-sized reservoirs, Zhugou and Tiangang, plus 58 small reservoirs, breached and collapsed within a few hours. Zhumadian, Xuchang (including Luohe, which became an independent municipality after 1986), Zhoukou, Nanyang, and the Wuyang Industrial Zone (now Wugang City, administered by Pingdingshan), as well as 30 counties and cities across these five regions of Henan, along with the adjacent Linquan County in Fuyang, Anhui, all suffered from the floods.

According to the “Records of the ‘75·8’ Flood Fighting in Zhumadian Region, Henan Province” (compiled by the Zhumadian Regional Water Resources Bureau and published by the Yellow River Water Conservancy Press in 1998), the dam breaches occurred around midnight while people were asleep. The breach of the Shimantan Reservoir was at 00:00 on August 8, 1975; ten minutes later, the Banqiao Reservoir collapsed.

In fact, before these two large reservoirs collapsed, by 21:00 on the night of August 7, seven small reservoirs had already breached in Queshan and Biyang; at 22:00, the medium-sized Zhugou Reservoir breached. At this time, the water in Suiping County town was already waist-deep. After the Banqiao Reservoir breached, Shahedian Town, closest to the reservoir, was the first to be swallowed by the water. At least 827 people died out of a total population of over 6,000. Wencheng Commune, separated from Shahedian Town by a river, missed the opportunity for self-rescue because they could not hear what was being signaled from the other side of the river, resulting in heavy casualties.

The surge from the Banqiao Reservoir breach flowed downstream at an average speed of about 6 meters per second, and roughly three hours after the breach, it had spread to Suiping County, with the flow widening to 10 kilometers. The water depth on the flat ground near Suiping County town was about 4.5 meters, and the water depth on the tracks at Suiping Station on the Beijing-Guangzhou Railway line was about 3 meters.

It can be seen from some records that when the water had already swallowed villages and entered cities, effective rescue had not yet begun. Ji Pomin, son of then-Vice Premier Ji Dengkui, wrote in the article “What I Know About the ‘1975 Henan Flood’”:

On the evening of August 8, my father and Liu Jianxun (then First Secretary of Henan Province) were still in Luoyang (solving the problem of Cultural Revolution factional struggles in large enterprises). Wang Weiqun, Deputy Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee and Commander of the Production Command Post of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee, suddenly called to report that something had happened at the Banqiao Reservoir in the Zhumadian area! Due to the interruption of communications, the specific situation was not yet clear. My father and Liu Jianxun immediately returned to Zhengzhou overnight to listen to reports, understand the situation, arrange flood control and disaster relief, report to the Central Committee, and request military support.

It is evident that although the heavy rain lasted for several days, the Henan Provincial Party Committee neither foresaw the possibility of catastrophic rainfall leading to dam breaches, nor were they focused on it, as they were busy with Cultural Revolution factional struggle issues in Luoyang. By the time they learned of the Banqiao Reservoir breach, nearly a whole day had passed, and the specific details were still unclear.

According to Qian Gang’s account, at 08:00 on August 9, 1975, the Zhumadian Regional Party Committee sent an urgent telegram — “Our region experienced extraordinary rainstorms from the 5th to the 8th, with an average rainfall of 800 mm and average water accumulation of about 2 meters. It is a vast ocean. The Banqiao Reservoir breached at 0:40 on the 8th, Suiping County town was submerged, and many people died. Due to the serious disaster caused by the rainstorm and flood, more than 3 million people are surrounded by floodwaters, some have been trapped on rooftops or in trees for two or three days, and the situation is extremely critical!”

In addition to the ferocity of the flood, Qian Gang found some incomplete telephone records and status reports from the archives of the Zhumadian region. These original records disclosed the tragic conditions of the people of Zhumadian in their dire straits after the dam breaches:

August 13 — the water in eastern Xincai and Pingyu is still rising, 2 cm per hour, 2 million people across the region are in the water; Runan: 100,000 people submerged (referring to those still floating in the water), 40,000 rescued, 60,000 still trapped in trees, requesting emergency rescue; 200,000 people in the county have swollen faces and legs, diarrhea, no medicine… Until August 16, 1.2 million people in the entire region were still in the water. After the flood, the incidence of disease rose rapidly, and secondary disasters were severe. Besides disease, there was no food; in some places, people were still on the dikes eating insects and tree leaves…

Reservoirs Built During the “Socialist Upsurge”

In fact, the shadow of this unprecedented disaster was planted as early as the Great Leap Forward in 1957. According to Qian Gang’s article, in the early 1950s, Henan reinforced the Banqiao and Shimantan reservoirs. After the expansion of these two reservoirs, the Great Leap Forward began, and “reservoir construction in the Central Plains surged forward and could not be stopped.” “From 1957 to 1959 alone, more than 100 reservoirs were built in the Zhumadian region. The midwife for a large batch of new reservoirs was the ‘Socialist Upsurge’ then roaring across the land of China.”

According to accounts, during the Great Leap Forward in 1958, Henan summarized the experience of building mountainous water conservancy in the Manghe River basin. When then-Vice Premier Tan Zhenlin came to Henan for inspection, he summarized it as “focusing on storage, focusing on small-scale projects, and focusing on self-management by communes and brigades,” and said: “Now that the problem of mountainous areas is solved, the Manghe experience should be promoted to the plains.” Water conservancy expert Chen Xing immediately pointed out: focusing on storage in the plains while neglecting drainage would cause serious damage to the water environment, and so on. But the expert’s advice was ignored, and he was labeled a right-deviationist and sent down. The “storage-focused” experience was later widely promoted to Anhui, and a large number of small reservoirs emerged in hilly areas, causing a fatal “intestinal obstruction” in the Huai River basin for decades to come.

Chen Xing later summarized in the book “Water Management Has No End” that one of the main reasons for the Henan flood was the failure of water conservancy construction planning and decision-making after 1949. This included: emphasizing storage over drainage leading to insufficient designed drainage sluices, and the Great Leap Forward-style water conservancy construction after the 1950s, where many quality hazards existed and were not eliminated in time. In fact, during the Great Leap Forward, a large number of small and medium-sized reservoirs and dams themselves were political products, lacking rigorous planning and construction from design to quality.

Embarrassing Flood Prevention Under the Backdrop of the Cultural Revolution

Looking back today, it is clear that during the Cultural Revolution, like other provinces across the country, cadres in Henan were busy dealing with various political movements. In terms of flood prevention, there was a complete lack of risk-awareness and material preparation.

To give an example — according to Yu Weimin and Ye Shuxin’s Account of the Inside Story of the 75·8 Catastrophe (published by Yellow River Literature and Art Press in 1990), on August 6, Liu Peicheng, Commander of the Production Command Post of the Zhumadian Regional Revolutionary Committee, went to Banqiao for an inspection and convened a joint meeting of the Reservoir Management Bureau, Banqiao Commune, and military leaders to deploy flood fighting and rescue efforts: some advocated raising the dikes, while others advocated blowing up the auxiliary dam to discharge the flood and reduce pressure on the main dam. Various opinions were deadlocked, and the meeting lasted for more than an hour. Until the very end, people suddenly discovered that none of the plans for flood fighting and rescue could be implemented. The Vice Chairman of the Reservoir Revolutionary Committee told everyone embarrassedly: there were no shovels or straw bags in the flood prevention warehouse, let alone an ounce of explosives—only a few small wooden sticks and some wooden-handled grenades used for militia training.

In fact, this disaster was not impossible to prevent. According to Chen Xunbie’s article “The Most Tragic Dam Breach Accident in Contemporary China, Not a Word Reported by the Media at the Time,” at 23:00 on August 6, the water level of the Banqiao Reservoir had already reached 122.91 meters, while the highest designed storage water level was only 110.88 meters. The main spillway gate was raised above the water surface, and the water transport channels were all opened for discharge at 01:00 on the 7th, yet the water level was still rising sharply. At that time, some suggested opening all gates for discharge or even digging openings to release the water, but absolutely no one was willing to take responsibility and provide a decision.

The “75·8” Great Flood That Vanished From the Press: Cannot Let Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Be Provoked

Even though it was such a huge disaster, the Chinese media in 1975 did not report a single word. Many years later, Xinhua News Agency reporter Zhang Guangyou revealed some of the inside story in an article in the now-defunct independent history journal Yanhuang Chunqiu:

I already knew the head of the condolence delegation and Vice Premier of the State Council, Ji Dengkui. He was approachable and cared much about reporters and publicity reports. After the delegation arrived in the disaster area, he spoke with me several times. He said: ‘This Central Condolence Delegation is both a condolence group and a “working group.” While doing a good job in condolence work, we should assist the local government as much as possible to do some work and solve some practical problems in flood fighting, rescue, and disaster relief.’

I asked Ji Dengkui: How should this flood be reported? He said: ‘The central leadership has already decided that this flood will not be reported publicly; no news will be released. Especially the disaster situation itself—not only will it not be reported publicly, but it must also be kept secret.’ I didn’t understand this and immediately asked back: Why? Can a flood of such a large scale be kept secret? He said: ‘This is the decision of the central leadership, and your general office leaders have already been informed. But this doesn’t mean you have nothing to do. Your task is not only to go to the disaster sites with the condolence delegation; you should also create some internal references (neican) to promote advanced figures and deeds in the flood rescue, such as: sacrificing oneself for others, sacrificing the small family for the big family, and the communist style of “one place in trouble, eight places support”; especially, you need to grasp some important issues, go deep into reality, and conduct some investigations and research.’

In the early 80s, after Ji Dengkui stepped down from his central leadership position and went to work at the State Council’s Rural Development Research Center, we met often. Once, in casual conversation, we spoke about the fact that the flood was not allowed to be reported publicly and that investigation report. He said: Not allowing public reporting was for fear of creating side effects and affecting stability; at that time, Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou were seriously ill, and not allowing public reporting was also for fear that they would be provoked (upset). Internal reports could only have a very small amount selected for them to see, and this kind of internal report wouldn’t be shown to them; as for that investigation report, I saw it, it was a very persuasive piece of material, but by then, it could no longer be attended to…’

— (Zhang Guangyou, “Witnessing the 1975 Huai River Great Flood,” published in Yanhuang Chunqiu)

It turns out that one important reason the official side not only kept this huge disaster private but also demanded secrecy was for fear of “affecting stability,” especially because Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou were seriously ill and “could not be provoked.”

How Many People Actually Died? Local Memories and the Scarcity of Historical Records

In 2005, the American “Discovery Channel” called this great flood one of the world’s “Top 10 Man-Made Technological Disasters.” But in China, because of long-term artificial blocking, very few people know about this disaster.

Fourteen years after the great flood, in July 1989, the book “Great Floods in Chinese History (Part 1),” with a preface by former Chinese Minister of Water Resources Qian Zhengying, was published in the form of an “internal distribution edition.” The book disclosed part of the disaster situation from an official perspective for the first time.

The book revealed that in the “75·8” Great Flood, 29 counties and cities and 17 million mu (15 mu = 1 hectare) of farmland in Henan Province were flooded, of which 11 million mu of farmland suffered devastating damage. 11 million people were affected, and more than 26,000 died. This resulted in 102 kilometers of the railway (Beijing-Guangzhou Line) that runs through mainland China from Beijing to Guangzhou being washed out, interrupting traffic for 18 days and affecting transportation for 48 days, with direct economic losses of nearly 10 billion yuan.

In March 1990, Henan Daily reporters Yu Weimin and Ye Shuxin published the reportage “Account of the 75·8 Catastrophe.” As a public publication, it presented the disaster situation relatively completely and became the first monograph on the “75·8” flood.

In recent years, carrying curiosity about that period of history, I have searched for records of this great flood in Henan. I found that there are very few books related to it. Among the officially compiled books, besides the aforementioned “Records of the ‘75·8’ Flood Fighting” compiled by the Zhumadian Regional Water Resources Bureau, there is also “Experiences of the 1975 Huai River Great Flood” (Chinese Communist Party History Materials Vol. 84) compiled by the Central Party History Research Office and the Central Archives in 2002; as well as “The ‘75·8’ Extraordinary Flood Disaster in Henan” compiled by the Henan Water Resources Department in July 2005.

These archives, compiled under the auspices of water conservancy departments, focus more on how meteorology and hydrology affected the engineering projects, leading to the disaster, and how to eventually restore the water conservancy projects. They also involve how to organize disaster relief and restore production, but all from the perspective of the state.

Locally, the “Literary and Historical Materials” organized by the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) of various cities and counties in southern Henan, such as “Zhumadian Literary and Historical Materials,” have specials on the “758” flood in the fourth, eighth, and ninth volumes, mainly consisting of collections of memories from relief participants who once worked in government departments.

In the archives of Xiangcheng, Zhoukou City, there are county committee files recording this “flood fighting,” as well as a set of “Flood Fighting and Disaster Relief Newspaper” printed by the Xiangcheng County Flood Fighting and Disaster Relief Command Post. This newspaper is the only set of local newspapers in Xiangcheng regarding “flood fighting and disaster relief.” In 2010, the Xiangcheng CPPCC Materials Editorial Department edited and compiled a “Collection of Materials on the 75·8 Flood Fighting and Disaster Relief in Xiangcheng” (Zhang Futang, Liu Yajun, Zhoukou Daily) based on these materials and the memories of those who experienced the flood fighting and relief at the time.

Around 2010, Chinese media was in the midst of a relatively brief period of relaxation. At that time, media such as Southern Weekly, Southern Metropolis Daily, and Yanhuang Chunqiu provided some rich details through reporting, especially on the 35th anniversary of the great flood in 2010.

After the rise of self-media, memories with ordinary people as the subject and from a first-person perspective gradually appeared. There are accounts from some veterans who participated in the rescue, such as veterans from the Wuhan Military Region Bridge-building Units, and also some from medical personnel, but accounts by local eyewitnesses remain scarce.

In July 2021, severe flooding occurred in Henan again. According to reports, 13 reservoirs faced an emergency. I saw with heartache that in my hometown, Henan people who had experienced the tragic “75·8” flood still lacked preparation and risk-awareness. From the emergency response to the failure to promptly report flood discharges, the concealment of casualty figures, etc., it seems that the problems exposed by the “75·8” flood 46 years ago are being repeated (see “Investigation Report on the ‘7·20’ Extraordinary Rainstorm Disaster in Zhengzhou, Henan”).

How many people actually died in this unprecedented flood that occurred during the Cultural Revolution? To this day, it remains a mystery.

According to the article “Ji Dengkui and Ulanhu Condole the Zhumadian Flood” (published in Zhumadian “Literary and Historical Materials” Vol. 2, author Wei Shichang), on August 15, the Central Condolence Delegation held a condolence meeting at the local theater, attended by then-Vice Premier Ji Dengkui. During the period, Ji Dengkui called over Regional Party Secretary Su Hua and Regional Party Deputy Secretary Wei Shichang to ask how many people might have died in this flood. The two reported, “It’s possible more than 100,000 people died.” — This is also the first death statistic reported to the Central Committee that can be traced.

On August 20, 12 days after the dam breaches, according to preliminary statistics from the Henan Provincial Party Committee, more than 85,600 people died in the whole province; including those from elsewhere who died in the disaster area, the total would not exceed 100,000 at most. At that time, the Henan Provincial Party Committee believed this figure was relatively accurate. The Central Condolence Delegation cited this figure in the report on the disaster situation in Henan and Anhui written for the Central Committee.

However, the aforementioned Xinhua reporter Zhang Guangyou, who went deep into the disaster area for interviews with the Central Condolence Delegation at the first opportunity, believed that the originally reported figure of 85,000 was too high and that it was no more than 40,000 at most. This figure is close to the official figure. On page 83 of the book Records of the 75·8 Flood Fighting in Zhumadian, the data provided by the local Water Resources Bureau is that, in the Zhumadian region, “22,564 people drowned, 1,633 died of disease, and 92,096 were injured.”

In 2025, the Discovery Channel program and some unofficial figures put the death toll at 200,000. This figure includes not only the direct victims while sleeping on the night of the dam breaches but also the victims of the explosion-assisted flood discharges and diversions a few days later, as well as those who died from the spread of plague and hunger after the disaster.

Fifty-one years have passed, and to this day, because the information is not open and transparent, the true death toll of this great flood in fact remains a mystery.

 

Recommended Archives:

Great Floods in Chinese History (Part 1)

Chronicles of the August 1975 Flood Control in Zhumadian Prefecture, Henan Province

Collection of Materials on Flood Control and Disaster Relief in Xiangcheng, August 1975

Inside Account of the 75.8 Catastrophe

 

Extended Reading:

Qian Gang: The World’s Largest Reservoir Dam Breach Tragedy — The 1975 Zhumadian Flood

Jiang Hua, Yu Chen: Water Tomb: Commemorating the Henan “1975.8” Extraordinary Flood (2010 Southern Metropolis Daily)

Tencent History: The Most Tragic Dam Breach Accident in Contemporary China, Not a Word Reported by the Media at the Time

 

[The views expressed by the author of this article do not necessarily reflect the position of the China Unofficial Archives.]